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, the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOEDS-40), and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The direction for technical support activities was established at the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) advisory group meeting and subsequent consultants' meetings on safeguards related to the final disposal of nuclear material contained in waste and spent fuel. Task directions for the development of international safeguards in support of the final disposal of spent fuel are currently being provided by DOEDS-40. A summary of safeguards activities performed by the Waste Management Safeguards Project is provided in Table 1 .
Although the general impression exists that spent fuel conditioning and repository facilities need low priority for the development of safeguards approaches, conditioning and repository facility construction are now occurring (Table 2) . Away-from-reactor dry storage facilities are operating in the United States, Germany, and Canada. The German Pilot Conditioning Facility is under construction and scheduled to begin operations in 1996. Excavation of repository characterization shafts and tunnels of the German and U.S. repository projects is being conducted. The characterization shafts and tunnels (including underground laboratory facilities) will become part of the final repositories if the Gorleben and Yucca Mountain sites are determined to be acceptable.
Systems for design information verification for spent fuel consolidation and conditioning operations are needed immediately. Safeguards approaches for maintaining continuity of knowledge of spent fuel processed at the conditioning facility and for verification of the final disposal package will be needed within three years. Systems for design information verification of the repository facilities will be needed by the end of the decade.
In the reports from the IAEA consultant's meetings, IAEA SP-1 task outlines, and DOE International Safeguards Program plans, tasks have been identified that need to be performed if effective safeguards are to be implemented at the conditioning and repository facilities and if safeguards are to be implemented with minimum impact on CRWMS. These tasks are summarized and correlated in Table 3 . Tasks supporting the application of international safeguards in the United States and at the CRWMS facilities should be directed by DOE. Technical assistance in the development of international safeguards approaches and of safeguards technology will be provided by the United States to the IAEA. Tasks requiring the integration of activities being performed by multiple States should be directed by IAEA. All task activities will require maintenance of a dialogue between DOE and IAEA. 
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Four stages in the flow of spent fuel from reactors to final disposal exist: (a) reactors and away-from-reactor storage, (b) spent fuel conditioning for disposal, (c) spent fuel positioning in the final repository, and (d) closure of the repository. Spent fuel does not qualify as being practicably irrecoverable at any point before or after placement in a geological formation commonly described as a permanent repository. IAEA should not terminate safeguards on spent fuel. For the stage involving fuel in reactors, awayfrom-reactor storage, and up to the start of conditioning of spent fuel, spent fuel can be safeguarded using adaptations of existing safeguards measures. The process starting with conditioning of spent fuel and ending with final placement in a permanent repository raises new safeguards problems associated with (a) dismantling and consolidating of the original assemblies, (b) placing the spent fuel in the disposal container, and (c) emplacing the disposal container in the repository. This process 1
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would require increased reliance on containment and surveillance (C/S), including other monitoring systems, to assure continuity of knowledge of the flow and inventory of the nuclear material. If the safeguards system fails to provide the assurance required, reestablishing continuity of knowledge by remeasurement may not be possible. Research and development to provide the necessary C/S and monitoring systems should be started with high priority following the necessary system studies and be conducted in consultation with IAEA Spent fuel can be considered to be virtually inaccessible for physical verification (a) when the particular area, or drift, containing it is backfilled or (b) when all repository operations are completed and the repository is closed. Closed drifts in operating repositories will create unique problems that must be solved by research and development. Technical and legal problems must be resolved before implementing safeguards for a closed repository. Several decades will elapse before a repository is closed; thus, problems associated with closed repositories should be addressed, but with a low priority.
After the advisory group meeting, the waste management safeguards effort focused on development of safeguards termination criteria. This effort was directed and sponsored by the U.S. Department technologies for spent fuel conditioning and disposal, the United States contributed assessments of the safeguards issues for spent fuel consolidation and for geologic disposal. These assessments were based on CRWMS system designs at the time of the evaluation. Knowledge of proposed system designs in other nations were factored into the assessments. Since the evaluation was completed, system designs have evolved and some have undergone major changes. However, the generic safeguards concerns and approaches remain applicable to the systems. The safeguards assessment of spent fuel consolidation identified the seven potential diversion scenarios shown in Fig Safeguards approaches were developed to address the safeguards concerns identified for these scenarios. The approaches were developed as a perimeter safeguards system, a pin-tracking and verification safeguards system, and a combined system. The perimeter system is operationally preferred because it would have minimal impacts on the consolidation operations. This system would verify the quantity of spent fuel input to and removed from the consolidation operation and would verify that no fuel left the consolidation process area except in the declared removals. Technologies for implementing this approach were proposed. The pin-tracking system would require process design verification, authentication of operator's process data, and verification of the spent fuel pins as they are removed from the assembly and transferred to the consolidation canister. Technologies for implementing this approach were also proposed.
The safeguards assessment of spent fuel disposal in a geologic repository identified three primary safeguards issues:' (1) verifylng that declared spent fuel is received, (2) tracking the spent fuel through transfer and repackaging operations, and (3) verifylng that spent fuel is not removed from the storage, process, and underground repository areas during active repository operations and after repository closure (Fig. 2) . The five major repository operations evaluated were mining, cask receiving and storage, spent fuel repackaging, package emplacement, and repository backfilling and closure. Safeguards issues with the mining operations involved the speed of excavation; the effort required to excavate clandestine paths, workshops, or processing areas; and the difficulty to retrieve emplaced material. Verification of design information for and monitoring of the underground repository was identified as a concern because mining, emplacement, and backfilling may occur simultaneously.
Safeguards approaches were developed to address the safeguards concerns identified through these scenarios. The approaches were developed as perimeter safeguards systems, spent fuel verification safeguards systems, and combined systems. All systems required repository design verification. The perimeter systems are operationally preferred because they would have minimal impacts on the repository operations. These systems would verify (1) spent fuel input to and removed from the repackaging or conditioning facility, (2) spent fuel transferred to the underground repository, and (3) that no fuel left the repackaging and/or conditioning process area or underground repository except in the declared removals. Technology requirements for implementing these approaches were proposed. The spent fuel verification systems would require (1) authentication of the operator's repackaging and/or conditioning process data, (2) verification of the spent fuel as it is removed from the transport cask and transferred to the disposal cask or canister, (3) verification of the spent fuel's presence in the repository until backfilling occurs, and (4) verification of the integrity of backfilled drifts.
consultants' Recommendations5
The IAEA "Consultants' Meeting on Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositories" is stated by the IAEA to be "... only a first attempt by IAEA to define an appropriate safeguards system for the final disposal of spent fuel ...I' and to require 'I ... a coordinated effort through joint support programme tasks ....'I The consultants' report g e n e r a l i d the operations and design of nuclear power plant storage, away-from-reactor storage, conditioning facility, and final geological repository for the participating countries. Based on these generalized characteristics, the consultants' recommended the following safeguards concepts:
1. For the effective application of safeguards to spent fuel in conditioning and final repository facilities, an unbroken continuity of knowledge of the nuclear material content of the spent fuel (based on operator data and verified by IAEA) is required. The facilities should be thought of as item rebatching facilities, and item accounting would be a practical material accounting approach for these facilities. Rebatching would be performed on an item basis, thus allowing all material to be accounted for. Efforts should be made to minimize broken rods, loose pellets, and powder. Future facilities should be designed in a manner to facilitate item accounting.
IAEA should verify operator's declared values
by maintaining continuity of knowledge of the nuclear material items. The nuclear material content of the spent fuel is calculated by the operator based on the nuclear material content of the fresh fuel and the irradiation history. Continuity of knowledge will depend on successful application by IAEA of a C/S system and maintenance of item integrity.
When rebatching occurs, the safeguards measures should involve design verification in combination with monitoring of all material movements in to and out of the process area supplemented with, if necessary, by monitoring of nuclear material within the process area. The safeguards measures should confirm that the nuclear material in items going in to and out of the process area are accounted for without loss of continuity of knowledge. 3. Consolidation of spent fuel could take place at a reactor's spent fuel storage pool, at a separate facility, or at the conditioning facility. A separate consolidation facility should be safeguarded as an item facility in accordance with the previous items. Introduction of consolidation equipment to a reactor storage pool constitutes a change in facility design requiring that the portion of the pool in which the equipment is located be treated as a separate consolidation facility. The disassembly of fuel assemblies into pins with reassembly of the pins into a close pack configuration in a new package is considered an item rebatching operation. 4. Shipment of spent fuel to an away-fromreactor facility, a consolidation facility, a conditioning facility, or a geological repository will be based on a unique identifiable item and knowledge of the nuclear material content of the spent fuel based on shipper's declared values. Shipments would be covered by C/S measures. Nondestructive assay (NDA) for gross and partial defect tests could be performed on the spent fuel if C/S failed to preserve continuity of knowledge. Accuracy of these measurements may be degraded for consolidated fuel. Various attribute checks may be used to secure continuity of knowledge, but NDA for verification of nuclear material content in sealed casks and canisters would be precluded.
Safeguards for conditioning of spent fuel and for disposal in the geologic repository will use an integrated safeguards verification system (ISVS).
A n ISVS combines components of monitoring (e.g., radiation and weight among others) and C/S systems into complementary systems that take advantage of the strengths of each. A fundamental assumption of the safeguards approach is that nuclear material becomes "difficult to access" when placed in a disposal container. Thus, sufficient redundancy, diversity, and robustness must be designed into the safeguards system to assure maintenance of continuity of knowledge. This assurance can be provided through verification of container integrity and establishment of characteristics that uniquely identify the container and its contents (e.g., radiation signatures, weight, weld signatures, and heat output, among others). Current capabilities of NDA measurements cannot provide sufficient accuracy to establish a measured material balance. Current NDA procedures are capable of partial defect measurements of single assemblies but not of multiple assemblies. NDA systems should be a part of ISVS.
The safeguards approach for conditioning facilities should include the following features:
1. Received items should be verified by IAEA before shipment and continuity of knowledge preserved by C/S. If verification is not performed before shipment or if continuity of knowledge is not assured, the nuclear material content must be verified on receipt. 2. Traceability of items rebatched from received containers into shipping containers in the process cell is critical. Of crucial importance to the safeguards approach is identification and evaluation of items input to and removed from the rebatching process area. An ISVS should confirm declared process flows by surveillance of all potential diversion paths from the process area. Safeguards verifying inputs to and removals from the process area that are applied external to the process cell are preferred. If the effectiveness of this approach is not guaranteed, application of an ISVS within the process cell or authentication of outputs from operator's systems within the process cell may be required. 3. The nuclear material content of shipped items will be based on operator's data and on the continuity of knowledge maintained by the safeguards systems implemented at the facility. Reactor history and individual fuel assembly identifications will not be important because multiple assemblies will be repackaged into a new sealed container. Verification of nuclear material content should be performed at the exit from the process cell at the level required
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by IAEA for verification of materials being placed in difficult-to-access storage. This verification should occur as close as practical to the point of packaging of the spent fuel into the final disposal container.
The safeguards approach for geological repositories should include the following features:
1. Safeguards procedures should be based on item integrity, item accounting, and item transfer. Receipts at the repository facility will be verified for item identity and item integrity. 2. To maintain continuity of knowledge, disposal containers received and stored at the repository are safeguarded using an ISVS until transferred underground. An ISVS implemented at repository accesses will record the identity and status of casks and the direction of nuclear material flow. 3. All accesses to the geological repository's underground facility are safeguarded to monitor transfers of nuclear material. Within the underground facility, knowledge of the location of the nuclear material is not important; what is important is knowledge that the material was transferred underground and remains there.
Design information regarding the vault design
will be verified and periodically reverified to update IAEA knowledge of the underground facility. The open areas of the underground facility will continually change as new emplacement areas are excavated and filled areas are backfilled. Unannounced inspections should be considered. ,
5.
Items emplaced in the geologic repository are safeguarded as nuclear material rebatched into a new container, which is the geologic medium. During the postclosure phase of the repository, site inspections, visual observation of the ground surface, and geophysical techniques to determine the extent of backfill in cavities and to detect other excavations near the repository should be considered.
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Develop To achieve the task objectives specified in SP-1 92PSS26, IAEA identified the following tasks:
2.
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Establish design specifications for inventory verification systems for conditioning plants, active and passive operating repositories, and closed repositories through (a) identifying and evaluating diversion routes, (b) evaluating concealment methods, (c) identifying commonalities of diversion paths and detection elements, (d) identifying and evaluating effective safeguards approaches; and (e) identifying the optimum approach. Identify safeguards approaches and technology for verification and reverification of conditioning plant and repository facility design information. Investigate techniques for resource optimization to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards at spent fuel disposal facilities. Investigate the potential for geophysical techniques to fulfill requirements for verification of the status of backfilled drifts as well as all underground excavations and investigate the use of NDA and C/S for safeguarding emplaced containers. Investigate the use of safety-related design features and safety-related information for safeguards purposes. Develop quality assurance standards for the safeguarding of the final disposal of spent fuel.
3, WASTEMANAGEMENTSAFEGUARDS REVIEW GROUP^
The International Safeguards Program for CRWMS was formed to support the potential application of IAEA safeguards at CRWMS facilities and on CRWMS operations and to ensure that the technologies and approaches necessary to implement effective international safeguards for CRWMS will be available when they are needed. The CRWMS facilities will be eligible for IAEA safeguards and are expected to be among the first spent fuel and high-level waste disposal operations worldwide; thus, they are expected to be selected by IAEA for the application of international safeguards. The mission of WMSRG is to provide management oversight and coordination of activities related to identification and development of safeguards approaches and technology for the effective application of international safeguards to CRWMS.
DOE contractor providing technical support to WMSRG. In FY 1994, LANL and SNL will also have task responsibilities. Task responsibilities under this project include system studies, policy analysis, and strategies development to provide advanced safeguards concepts for spent fuel and waste management activities. Activities under the project include investigations of advanced safeguards concepts that would enhance the verification techniques and capabilities of international, regional, and bilateral regimes to provide timely detection of loss of spent fuel at nuclear reactors, reprocessing plants, and longterm storage facilities. LANL and SNL have specific responsibilities for participating in international exchanges addressing spent fuel safeguards and for developing and assessing technologies applicable to safeguarding spent fuel storage, conditioning, and repository facilities. The following safeguards procedures are recommended for IAEA safeguards when spent fuel and high-level waste are accepted into CRWMS:
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Spent fuel containers received from facilities under active safeguards should be inspected, or verified at the CRWMS facility to confirm identity and integrity in accordance with the IAEA criteria and practices. Fig-3 . U.S. modular horizontal dry storage.
RECOMMENDATONS
Although the general impression exists that spent fuel conditioning and repository facilities need low priority for the development of safeguards approaches, conditioning and repository facility construction is now occurring ( Table 2) . Away-from-reactor dry storage facilities are operating in the United States, Germany, and Canada (Figs. 3 and 4) . The German Pilot Conditioning facility is under construction and scheduled to begin operations in 1966 (Fig. 5) . Repository characterization shafts and tunnels of the German and US. repository project are currently being excavated (Fig. 6) . The characterization shafts and tunnels (including underground laboratory facilities) will become part of the final repositories if the Gorleben and Yucca Mountain sites are found to be acceptable.
Systems for design information verification for spent fuel consolidation and conditioning operations are needed immediately. Safeguards approaches for maintaining continuity of knowledge of spent fuel processed at the conditioning facility and for verification of the final disposal package are currently needed. Systems for design information verification of the repository facilities will be needed during this decade.
Identified Safepards Tasks
DOE and IAEA have identified tasks that need to be performed if effective safeguards are to be implemented at the conditioning and repository facilities and if safeguards are to be implemented with minimum impact on CRWMS. These tasks are listed in Appendix A.
For effective international safeguards that meet the safeguards system development objectives identified at the consultants' meeting, the following sequence of activities need to be accomplished.
Evaluate the generic diversion paths identified
at the consultants' meeting against the proposed facility designs. The proposed designs may make the paths considered more or less credible. (The Germans have initiated the use of PASE for their repository facility but not apparently for their conditioning facility.) A multinational technical investigation of proposed facility designs needs to be performed to identify credible diversion paths that must be safeguarded. These paths cannot be developed from intimate knowledge of just one facility design because the credible paths for each facility design may be different.
2.
Identify specific diversion paths. Once credible diversion paths have been identified, the paths must be described in detail to permit identification of detection points that may be used in developing the safeguards approaches.
EvaIuate generic safeguards approaches versus
the specific diversion paths. For the conditioning and repository facilities at least two safeguards approaches were identified (i.e., perimeter and process), with the perimeter approach (because of lower facility impacts) being favored. The technical effectiveness of the perimeter approach was questioned and must be determined. A multinational technical evaluation of the potential detection points and safeguards applicable to those detection points needs to be performed to determine the political and technical acceptability of using the detection points and the potential for technical success in applying safeguards at each usable detection point.
4.
Identify specific safeguards approaches and system design requirements. Safeguards applications for identified detection points need to be identified to minimize the number of detection points that must be used in the safeguards approach and to minimize the safeguards effort and technical requirements.
These approaches must consider IAEA use of authenticated safety, process, and safeguards
5.
6.
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equipment of the facility in addition to use of independent IAEA safeguards equipment.
The detection capabilities and vulnerabilities of each potential system must be identified and system design requirements established. Determine research and development requirements for the safeguards system. When the safeguards approaches are established, existing safeguards systems may be determined not to be capable of meeting the system design requirements. Research and development programs will need to be identified to (a) upgrade technology to meet the requirements, (b) combine the capability of multiple technologies to establish new systems, or (c) develop new technologies. Develop design information questionnaire (DIQ) form and guidance. Because the conditioning and repository facilities are new facilities that have not previously been safeguarded by IAEA, design information questionnaire forms and guidance will need to be developed to ensure that IAEA obtains the necessary information from each facility to effectively verify the facility operations and to develop facility-specific safeguards approaches. Develop design information verification procedures and requirements. The conditioning and repository facilities will present new challenges for design information verification. The conditioning facility will be an active physical process with many operational flexibilities. The repository will be a facility whose design is continually changing as new drifts are excavated and filled drifts are backfilled. Determine research and development requirements for the design information verification system. When the design information verification system approaches are established, existing technologies may be determined not to be capable of meeting the system design requirements, Research and development programs will need to be identified to upgrade technology to meet the requirements, to combine the capability of multiple technologies to establish new systems, or to develop new technologies. Develop design requirements for ISVS, C/S, NDA, geophysical techniques, cask verification, information processing, and recordkeeping systems required to implement the safeguards approaches.
techniques.
Develop and evaluate new safeguards
11. Implement safeguards approaches.
The sequence of activities is applicable 3 both the consolidation and repository facilities. The activities associated with the conditioning facilities need to be performed first because one conditioning facility is being constructed and other conditioning facilities may begin operations within this decade. Activities for repositories may be addressed with lower priority but should be addressed within this decade. Tasks supporting the application of international safeguards in the United States and at the CRWMS facilities should be directed by DOE. Technical assistance in the development of international safeguards approaches and of safeguards technology will be provided to the IAEA by the United States. Tasks requiring the integration of activities being performed by multiple States should be directed by IAEA All task activities will require maintenance of a dialogue between DOE and IAEA
Member State Support Tasks
The IAEA SP-Uproposed task outline titled Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel begins to lay out a development program for identifying and developing a safeguards approach for spent fuel conditioning and repository facilities. Subtask 1 (Design Specification) of the SP-1 examines the credible diversion paths, evaluates candidate safeguards approaches, and recommends system design criteria. Subtask 2 (Design Information Verification System) uses the diversion path data from Subtask 1, evaluates candidate design information verification approaches, and recommends system design criteria. Subtask 4 (Geophysical Techniques and ISVS) uses the results from Subtasks 1 and 2 and begins to establish design criteria for technology to be used in the identified safeguards approaches identified for repository facilities.
The SP-1 task outline needs to be extended to evaluate the other technologies that may be required for the identified safeguards approaches, especially those related to conditioning facility safeguards. The following technologies identified in the consultants' meeting recommendations (in addition to geophysical techniques and ISVS for verifying underground repository activities) need to be developed (1) NDA fissile assay measurement systems for spent fuel; (2) ISVS and dual, independent C/S systems for conditioning and repository surface facilities; (3) authentication technology for verification of outputs from the facility operator's process, safety, and safeguards systems; (4) technology to identify and assure the integrity of final disposal canisters; and (5) a perpetual records system for disposed fuel. The ISVS developed for the repository accesses will need to be able to automatically separate casks containing spent fuel from casks containing highlevel waste. Particular attention needs to be paid to development of ISVSs for spent fuel consolidation activities. The consultants' meeting also recommended that revised safeguards timeliness criteria for spent fuel in closed repository facilities be established. Development of design information questionnaires needs to be addressed to ensure that IAEA obtains the information it needs for development and implementation of effective safeguards.
consultants' meeting, by the Member State contributions to the meeting, and by Member State support tasks. The consultants' meeting recommendations provide a framework for the development of a safeguards approach; however, the recommendations do not assure that all credible diversion strategies for each State's conditioning and repository facility designs have been evaluated or that optimal safeguards approaches were identified. The Member State contributions and technical support assessments have been provided to IAEA based on the State's knowledge of its own facilities. Effort needs to be provided under Subtask 1 to assess the identified diversion strategies versus multiple State systems and to develop candidate safeguards approaches that address the credible diversion paths. The diversion paths and potential safeguards approaches need to be described and evaluated more comprehensively and in greater detail.
SP-1 Subtasks 3, 5, and 6 are not mandatory for accomplishment of the IAEA's objectives. Subtask 1 was partially addressed by the 11 Subtask 5 could be incorporated into Subtask 1. The use of authenticated safety data should be evaluated for use in development of the IAEA safeguards approaches. The technical support requested in Subtasks 3 and 6 should be developed from the global international safeguards perspective and then applied to safeguarding conditioning and repository facilities. A quality assurance system should be established and applied to all IAEA safeguards activities. From this IAEA-wide system, quality assurance programs should be developed that identify the requirements and inspection procedures specific to the spent fuel conditioning and repository facilities. Developing quality assurance programs individually for every safeguards approach without a central system will result in programs that cannot be effectively implemented.
The IAEA's consideration of artificial intelligence and advanced computer logic systems to address resource optimization (Subtask 3) should be praised. Automation of the resource optimization approach will permit more consistent and timely evaluation of diversion scenarios and selection of safeguards techniques. However, the accuracy of the automated system is highly dependent on the programmer's understanding of the manual resource optimization approach used for actual facilities. Use of artificial intelligence systems to automate evaluation processes requires that the evaluation process being modeled is well characterized. Rules-based and fuzzy logic systems require modeling the thought processes of an expert analyst. Neural networks require training the system through providing necessary data inputs and acknowledging correct decisions made by the system. Because PASE is still an evolving analytical tool, few expert analysts in the use of PASE currently exist. Use of automated systems based on processes that are not wellknown can result in unrecognized logic system failures. In addition, the design of the spent fuel management facilities continues to evolve, thus preventing the development of models using actual facility operations. In the absence of operating facilities, the automated evaluation system outputs cannot be performance tested to verify their accuracy. 
Spent Fuel Transportation
8
Determine potential means of spent fuel removal from a transportation cask (active).
Determine cask attributes that would uniquely identify a loaded transportation cask (active).
Assess surveillance and monitoring technologies to detect removal of spent fuel from cask (active). 12 Determine cask design features that would facilitate implementation of international safeguards (active).
Develop and evaluate international safeguards approach for CRWMS transport a tion sys tem (active).
13
~~ ~~
14 Determine requirements for multiple independent and redundant surveillance and monitoring systems for transportation casks (active). 26 Determine cask storage attributes that would verify the integrity of the storage casks.
Determine storage cask attributes that would uniquely identify a loaded storage cask.
27
28 Determine surveillance and monitoring systems to detect spent fuel removal from stored casks.
29 Determine cask design features that would facilitate implementation of international safeguards.
Determine multiple independent and redundant surveillance and monitoring systems for cask storage operations (active). Determine systems to verify the transfer of disposal casks underground.
Determine monitoring systems to detect the removal of nuclear material through vents and men and material shafts.
Determine monitoring systems to detect the removal of nuclear material through tuff and waste ramps.
Findings
Spent fuel storage, transfer, and shipping procedures were reviewed at the Oconee Nuclear Power Plant, South Carolina (wet handling in storage pool for modular horizontal storage, Fig. 3 ) and at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (dry handling in hot cell for vertical storage casks). Discussions confirmed that verification measurements are not performed on received, stored, or shipped spent fuel. If verification measurements were required, measurements would need to be performed during dry transfer of the spent fuel from the transport cask to the storage cask (Idaho) or performed at the spent fuel interim staging location used during loading of the storage canister (Oconee).
Verification measurement techniques have been developed that would be capable of verifying spent fuel at the gross, partial, and bias defect measurement levels. The following techniques have been developed (a) enhanced Cherenkov-glow device (gross defect), (b) gross neutron counting (gross defect), (c) gross gamma-ray counting and gamma-ray spectroscopy (gross defect), (d) gamma-neutron fork detector (partial defect), (e) gamma-ray tomography (partial defect), (f) active neutron measurement (bias defect), and (g) lead slowing-down time spectrometer (bias defect). Only the enhanced Cherenkov-glow device and the fork detector are routinely implemented by IAEA Facility-specific systems using gammaray and neutron systems have been implemented at a few facilities.
Cask loading verification techniques have been developed in support of IAEA The following techniques have been developed, however only manual and camera surveillance have been implemented: (a) manual surveillance, (b) camera surveillance, (c) laser surveillance system (LASSY), (d) crane monitoring, (e) automatic spent fuel identification number reader, and ( f ) integrated safeguards verification systems. ISVSs include detectors for radioactivity and direction of movement in addition to the above components.
IAEA personnel stated that high-level wastes on which safeguards have been terminated that are also disposed at the repository should not be an issue if they do not affect the safeguards implementation. However, high-level wastes will have similar radiation signatures as spent fuel and will be transported into the repository in similar shielding casks. Thus the high-level waste may not be distinguishable from spent fuel. A technology needs to be developed to provide automated separation of spent fuel from high-level wastes. 
